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Using a sample of China’s listed entrepreneurial firms, we investigate the relationship 
between bank connection, corruption and collateral requirements. We find that when a firm is 
connected with banks, collateral requirements are significantly lower. We also find that bank 
connection is the channel through which corruption is exercised to benefit those firms with 
favoured loan terms. Our analysis further reveals that bank connection and corruption have 
jointly improved bank lending efficiency. However, these positive effects become weaker 
with government intervention in the form of an economic stimulus package. We argue that in 
an emerging market, bank connection facilitates rent seeking and helps entrepreneurial firms 
to access bank loans with favoured loan terms, and this relationship-based financing relies on 
corruption.  Overall, our results are consistent with the view that in an emerging market non-
state sector growth is supported by relationship-based external financing and unconventional 
governance methods.     
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Recent literature concerns the relationship between banks and non-financial firms and its 
impact on firms’ financing policy. Using a sample of 20,000 commercial loans made to U.S. 
firms between 2000 and 207, Engelberg et al. (2012) suggest that in a matured market with a 
highly developed financial and legal system and advanced investor protection, firms’ 
connections with banks through pre-existing personal relationship can alleviate the 
information asymmetry and monitoring costs which in turn can reduce costs of borrowing 
and covenants. This new evidence from mature market prompts an important question, which 
has not yet been directly tested: due to the substantial differences in institutional 
environments with respect to financial and legal systems and investor protection, do 
connections with banks in an emerging market such as China also results in a lower cost of 
borrowing? And if this is the case, is it through the same mechanism of reducing information 
asymmetry and enhancing bank monitoring as in a developed market? 
This paper directly and explicitly addresses this issue by constructing a notion of bank 
connection, which is derived from the literature of political connection that studies the 
consequences of establishment of close relationship with governments. It is well established 
in the literature that a firm’s political connection will mitigate institutional constraint in 
emerging markets, such as China, where entrepreneurial  firms are discriminated against and 
denied access to bank loans. Existing literature finds that political connection as capital can 
help entrepreneurial  firms access bank loans and reduce the cost of borrowing through their 
rent seeking (Cull and Xu, 2003; Brandt and Li, 2003; Li et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010). As 
China’s institutional environment is recognized as having an underdeveloped financial and 
legal system and weak investor protection, the banking sector is dominated by state 
ownership of banks and state control of key resources necessary for corporate growth. Thus, 
entrepreneurial firms in China face many obstacles of accessing finance and heavy 
government regulations. In such an environment, political connection facilitates rent seeking, 
which helps entrepreneurial  firms overcome these market failures and avoid ideological 
discrimination (Li et al., 2008), and political connection is regarded as an alternative to legal 
protection (Chen et al., 2011a).  
We differentiate ourselves from prior studies with respect to measurement of bank 
relationships. The traditional way to measure political connection is to determine that either 
one of the firm's executives or a large shareholder is a former or current government or 
military official. We argue that this measure is too ambiguous in the specific context of bank 
lending, as some type of officials may not have effective or direct influence over the bank's 
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lending decisions. In our study we propose an alternative and direct measurement for the 
firm’s bank connection. In this study, a firm is identified as having a bank connection if any 
of its top executives, including the Chairman, CEO or other executives, the independent 
directors on its board or its largest shareholder currently work or have formerly worked as an 
executive or manager in the banking sector. The reason for including the connections of 
independent directors is that their monitoring role in China’s firms is impaired because their 
nomination is approved by the controlling shareholders, who may nominate connected 
independent directors with the aim of using their network with banking to bring benefits to 
themselves (Lin, Piotroski, Tan and Yang, 2012). When a relationship exists between a senior 
banker and a senior member of the borrower’s management, relationship-embedded financial 
contracting should occur, not only due to the nature of the relationship, but because rent 
creation and allocation occur through the relationship. Therefore, we conjecture that bank 
connections can encourage rent seeking from banks, and reduce collateral requirements. 
In addition, recent literature on corruption suggests that in a lending market, corruption 
has significant impact on firms’ access to external finance. Some literature finds that 
corruption reduces bank lending efficiency. For example, using an across-country study, 
Beck et al. (2006) find that corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms’ raising 
external finance, and some subsequent studies try to find ways to curtail lending corruption 
(Barth et al., 2009; Houston et al., 2011). In addition, in China, due to the low lending 
efficiency and huge rents available resulting from government intervention through heavily 
regulated credit market, corruption is quite pervasive in financial institutions (Pei, 2008). 
However recent studies have provided evidence that corruption can benefit some firms in 
China. For example, Cai, Fang and Xu (2011) find that although bribery to government 
officials deteriorates firm performance overall, this effect is much less pronounced for firms 
located in regions with low quality of government service and those subject to severe 
government expropriation. Furthermore, Chen, Liu and Su (2013) provide evidence that in 
China corruption plays a role in improving lending efficiency and aids entrepreneurial firms. 
Thus, we expect that in China embedded with insufficient or unreliable legal protection for 
investors, connected firms offer bribes in exchange for the favoured allocation of economic 
rents in form of accessing bank loans and lower cost of borrowing. A natural question can be 
raised: is corruption the channel for the connections to play the role in accessing external 
finance and a lower cost of borrowing? We will answer the question of whether and how the 
bank relationship interacts with corruption in affecting firms’ borrowing cost and bank 
lending efficiency.  
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To answer these questions, we extend existing studies by explicitly examining the 
impacts that bank connection, corruption, and their combination have on firms’ collateral 
requirements, using China’s listed entrepreneurial firms as the sample. We focus on collateral 
for two reasons. First, since the recent global financial crisis of 2007, creditors have 
expanded collateral requirements for their fund lending, and this observed tendency has again 
attracted considerable attention from academics and practitioners (Harrington, 2009). Second, 
extant studies suggest that collateral is a key ingredient used to enforce loan contracts as a 
response to information asymmetry (the source of adverse selection and moral hazard) 
(Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Boot et al., 1991; Jimenez et al., 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2012). 
In our study we use a sample of Chinese entrepreneurial firms because it offers an 
excellent environment to study bank relationships, for three reasons. First, China is the largest 
emerging market with a financial and legal system substantially different from that of 
developed countries. The relationship between borrowers and lenders in China is strongly 
influenced by borrowers’ political connections due to its unique institutional settings.  
Because entrepreneurial firms have suffered social and political discrimination, they have 
incentives to establish political connections to access bank loans, which are mainly controlled 
by the state (Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008; Chen, Lobo, Wang and Yu, 2011). Therefore, 
this unique institutional setting, under which borrows and lenders are related to each other 
through bank connections, expands our understanding of political connection literature.  This 
institutional environment allows us to answer the question: do firms’ bank connections matter, 
and if they do, do these relationships work the same way as in developed countries?  
Second, in an emerging market, corporate sector growth will be hampered due to 
financial constraints (La Porta et al., 2000). In this sense, the coexistence of both under-
development in the financial and legal system and high growth in the non-state sector in 
China allows a better understanding of the available sources of external finance, and the 
channel through which it achieves. Chen et al. (2013) argue that corruption in China is 
effective in improving capital allocation and aids non-state sector growth, and we are 
motivated to investigate through which channel corruption is exercised.  
Third, in a loan market where interest rates are not regulated by governments, a lender 
can price credit risk through interest rates as a substitute for pledging collateral. In this case 
academics face a potential endogeneity issue, where bank connection and collateral might 
have a joint impact on interest rates. China’s credit market provides a powerful setting to 
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address this question because the interest rates charged on bank loans are relatively regulated
1
, 
which limits lenders to pricing loans through interest rates. Finally, China's economic 
stimulus package represented an exogenous shock with respect to any individual firm; such a 
shock alleviates the endogeneity concern of bank connection. For these three reasons, our 
sample facilitates our research of exploring the economic implications of bank connections, 
corruption and collateral. 
Following both univariate and multivariate analysis, we find that collateral is 
significantly lower for firms connected with banks through their executives, largest 
shareholders or independent directors. Our results indicate that the average collateral 
requirement is 5% lower in bank connected firms compared with non-bank connected firms.  
Furthermore, we find that corruption relates to lower collateral, and the negative association 
between bank connection and collateral becomes more pronounced if the firm is able to spend 
more on corruption. An increase of one standard deviation in corruption reduces the average 
requirement for collateral by 3.4% for bank connected firms. The above evidence supports 
the view that bank connections facilitate rent seeking from banking sector through corruption. 
In other words, bank connected firms are able to offer bribes to banking officials in exchange 
for favoured loan terms. Our findings suggest that in an emerging market, bank connection 
encourages rent seeking from borrowers to lenders, rather than reducing information 
asymmetry or monitoring costs, as in developed markets. Our results also corroborate the 
findings of several studies that firms’ bank relationships and corruption have a significant 
effect on credit market outcomes in a relationship-based economy. In particular, Li et al. 
(2008) document that politically connected firms can obtain larger loans from banks. 
Engelberg et al. (2012) report that borrower-lender relationships relate to a lower cost of 
borrowing and covenants. Chen et al. (2013) provide evidence that corruption is helpful in 
improving lending efficiency and aiding entrepreneurial firms.  
In addition, from the perspective of government intervention, we provide evidence that 
an economic stimulus package announcement reduces banking lending efficiency. We find 
that an economic stimulus package mitigates the improving effect of corruption on collateral 
requirements. In additional tests, we find that bank connections facilitate rent seeking through 
corruption, which results in the improvement of bank lending efficiency. Our results of the 
effect of bank connections and corruption on collateral are robust when we take the 
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 The People’s Bank of China sets a lending rate as a benchmark for financial institutions to negotiate on each 
specific loan.  
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endogeneity of bank connections into consideration, as well as alternative measures of bank 
connections and collateral.  
Our study is related to several strands of the growing volume of literature. First, our 
study contributes to the literature on law, finance and growth by extending the research field 
that examines the financial implications of the institutional environment. The interesting 
phenomenon of  the coexistence in China of both an underdeveloped financial and legal 
system and high non-state sector growth has been explained by a relationship-based economy 
(Allen et al., 2005) and the use of unconventional governance methods, such as corruption, in 
the allocation of scarce economic resources (Chen et al., 2013). Our study extends further by 
identifying bank connections that facilitates corruption to obtain favoured loan terms for 
Chinese listed entrepreneurial firms.    
Second, to the best of our knowledge, there is no direct evidence on the relation between 
firms’ bank connections and lending efficiency. In this paper, we provide evidence for the 
presence of bank connections and corruption, and their joint effects on lending efficiency. 
This adds to the recent corruption literature. In addition, we explicitly use bank connections 
to capture firm behaviour in seeking rents from banks; this is a departure from previous 
studies that used former and current political connections as a proxy for rent seeking (Fan, 
Wong and Zhang, 2007; Faccio, 2010). We advance the traditional definition of political 
connections from two aspects. First, we develop a concept of bank connections that is more 
direct than the idea of general political connections with the government. Second, we also 
include the independent directors’ connection, which is broader than that of executives. Our 
findings complement previous studies by providing evidence that bank connections have a 
stronger effect than political connections on reducing collateral. We also add to the literature 
on the financial implications of political connections. While Sapienza (2004) and Faccio 
(2006, 2010) argue that connections with the government, whether voluntary (political 
connections) or involuntary (government ownership), will help firms access financial 
assistance from the government in the form of subsidies and loan supports, we expand their 
studies by using firms’ collateral as a direct and explicit proxy for this government-based 
benefit in terms of reduced collateral requirements.  
Third, we add to the literature on the borrower-lender relationship and its financial 
implications on credit market outcomes. Using U.S. firms as the sample, Engelberg et al. 
(2012) find that pre-existing personal relationships between the respective management of 
firms and banks relate to lower interest rates due to better information flow. In particular, 
they focus on the firm-bank personal relationship achieved if the respective managers have 
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previously worked together. In the spirit of Engelberg et al. (2012), we construct an 
alternative for firm-bank relationship, namely bank connection, if the firm’s management 
worked or is currently working as management of a bank. We argue that in China, with its 
underdeveloped institutional systems and the extensive government intervention in the 
financial system, entrepreneurial firms face discrimination by state-owned banks, who tend to 
award their loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Entrepreneurial firms therefore are 
likely to use their existing bank relationship and/or develop new ones with banks to seek 
rents from the institutional environment, as well as justify their existence. Using 
entrepreneurial firms as the sample, we document that a closer connection with banks 
facilitates access to bank loans with favourable terms in the form of lower collateral 
requirements. Our evidence also adds to another strand of literature on relationship banking, 
which argues that banks have an incentive to develop closer relationships with borrowers to 
facilitate monitoring, which can overcome moral hazards and adverse selection, and then to 
reduce the requirement for collateral (Jimenez and Saurina, 2004; Menkholl, Neuberger and 
Rungruxsirivorn, 2012)
2
. Last, because China has a concentrated ownership structure that is 
similar to those outside the U.S., our findings can suggest some international implications.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional 
background and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 describes the data methodology; Section 
4 discusses the empirical results and additional tests; and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background and development of hypotheses  
In this section we describe the institutional background in China that is related to our 
study, and develop corresponding hypotheses based on existing theories and China’s 
institutional system. 
2.1 Institutional background 
2.1.1 Banking industry and bank lending decisions  
In the late 1970s, the Chinese government launched a significant reform of the banking 
industry
3
. In the early 1980s, the government established four wholly state-owned banks (the 
Big Four), which took control of all the lending functions of the People’s Bank of China (the 
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 However the measures for relationship banking used in the existing literature are often arbitrary. For example, 
Chang, Liao, Yu and Zheng (2010) use the frequency of borrowing and the duration of lending and state 
ownership as proxies, while Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2011) and Menkhoff, Neuberger and 
Rungruxsirivorn (2012) focus on previous lending record. 
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central bank). In 1994, three wholly state-owned policy banks
4
 were established and took 
over policy lending from the Big Four banks. In 1996, joint stock commercial banks and city 
banks began to emerge. 
Originally, bank loans mainly took the form of credit loans, which were granted at low 
interest rates and without any guarantees or collateral. Such loans were one of the causes of a 
higher ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs). As this market-oriented economic reform 
deepened, banks became increasingly aware of loan risks, and from the 1990s they 
increasingly demanded guarantees or collateral. Indeed, according to a survey of 13 domestic 
banks between 2000 and 2005, the average collateral of secured loans increased from 22% to 
32% of all loans granted (Yang and Qian, 2008), of which land or buildings became the most 
acceptable form of collateral. Banks also demanded the equivalent value of fixed assets as 
collateral before granting loans, especially to privately controlled firms (Yeung, 2009). 
In addition, there was discrimination in granting these bank loans in favour of SOEs over 
entrepreneurial firms (Wei and Wang, 1997, Cull and Xu, 2003), with state-owned banks 
often lending to SOEs for political, employment and taxation purposes rather than 
profitability. As Yeung (2009) discussed, for these banks (Big Four SOCBs, policy banks, 
joint stock commercial banks and city banks), the decision of whether to grant loans was 
often determined by unofficial assessment criteria. SOEs tended to receive loans without 
pledging the necessary collateral because of state ownership, while entrepreneurial firms 
were expected to pledge collateral by securing their fixed assets to the equivalent value of the 
collateral required.   In other words, banks made a rational decision to bias their lending 
against entrepreneurial firms based on the higher risks and higher transaction and risk-
evaluation costs.  
2.1.2 Corruption in China 
Corruption is acknowledged to be an international phenomenon, especially in developing 
and emerging economies with underdeveloped financial systems, weak legal protection of 
investors and severe government intervention. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that the 
structure of government institutions and the political process are very important determinants 
of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies 
experience very high corruption levels. International evidence confirms that political 
decentralization could impede coordination and exacerbate incentives for officials at different 
levels to ‘overgraze’ the common bribe base (Fan et al., 2009), and state ownership of media 
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 These are State Development Banks, the Agricultural Development Bank of China and the Export and Import 
Bank of China.  
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is associated with high levels of bank corruption (Houston et al., 2011). In China, despite 
more than three decades of economic reform, the government exercises absolute control over 
the institutional and financial systems, and corruption acts as the proverbial grease for the 
bureaucratic wheels of an otherwise unmotivated banking system (Chen et al., 2013).  
According to a Transparency International survey in 2003, China’s corruption-perception 
index ranked in the lower half, with a score of 3.5 (on a scale of 1 to 10, with lower scores 
indicating greater public perceptions of corruption); while in 2012, this index (now calculated 
on a scale of 1 to 100) increased to 39, it was still in the lower half. For example, Mr Jinhuo 
Zhou, a former administrator in Fujian Province, took $16 million in bribes in exchange for 
the awarding of industrial and commercial contracts under his control. China’s financial 
sector is also beset by corruption. Kickbacks for loan approvals are routine. For example, in 
2012 eight top executives of the Agricultural Bank of China in Beijing were discovered 
taking bribes of around 10 million RMB for arranging a 0.7 billion RMB loan. Chen et al. 
(2013) also report that the average loss for the banks in each corruption case is 18 million 
RMB.   
2.1.3 Economic stimulus package 
The global financial crisis hit China hard, and induced a domestic-economy slowdown in 
second half of 2008. In response to the financial crisis, on 5 November 2008, the Chinese 
government announced a 4 trillion RMB (about $586 billion) economic stimulus package – 
constituting 12.5% of total GDP in spending from the fourth quarter of 2008 through 2010. 
The economic stimulus package refers specifically to investment spending. Of the total 4 
trillion RMB plan, the central government made a commitment to directly fund 1.18 trillion 
RMB of the investment, or 30% of the overall program, with the remainder to be funded by 
banks and local governments. Eventually the central government’s input to the stimulus 
totalled 1.6 trillion RMB, more than originally planned. Meanwhile, the local governments 
actively echoed the central stimulus program, which accounted for 70% to 75% of budgetary 
expenditures on fixed investment.  
Bank lending was the main source for investment spending in the stimulus package. 
Since the announcement of the central government’s stimulus package, bank credit has grown 
at an explosive pace due to the confluence of explicit policies designed to ease provision of 
credit.  The urgency and politicization of the stimulus sent banks a powerful signal that they 
were expected to rapidly ramp up lending. Moreover, government and political leaders' 
directions effectively eliminated all personal responsibility for the lending decisions, 
suggesting that bank loan officers would not be held accountable for loans they made, so long 
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as the loans supported the investment plan (Naughton, 2009; Wong, 2011)
5
. In particular, 
new bank credit grew by 4.2 trillion RMB in 2008 and more than doubled to 9.6 trillion RMB 
in 2009, although it fell slightly to 8 trillion RMB in 2010. 
2.2 Hypothesis development   
2.3.1 Bank connections and corruption 
In this paper, we derive bank connection from the literature on political connection. We 
argue that bank connection is a far more important institutional setting and offers a direct 
measurement for easier access to bank loans, particularly for emerging markets.  
Political connection is a common phenomenon across the world, especially in countries 
with weak financial institutions and concentrated ownership structures (Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnell, 2006). As a voluntary approach to connecting with the government, political 
connections can facilitate a firm’s rent seeking and assistance from the government (Chen, Li, 
Su and Sun, 2011). In particular, Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006) find that for 
financially distressed firms, politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out by the 
government than non-politically connected firms. Meanwhile, a large amount of evidence 
from both developed and emerging markets shows that political connections matter through 
preferential access to bank finance, and can affect the credit market and terms of the loan 
contract (Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008; Bliss and 
Gul, 2012). Among them, Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010) provide evidence that politically 
connected firms are regarded as a lower level of risk and relate to a higher bond rating and 
lower cost of borrowing.  
However, bank connection is a more direct measurement that facilitates borrowers’ rent 
seeking.  Along the lines of definitions for political connection, we define that a firm is 
connected with a bank if one of the top executives is working or used to work as the governor 
of a bank or bank branch (defined in detail later). Normally, there are two ways by which 
bank connections may help firms access bank loans with lower collateral. On one hand, bank-
connected executives can communicate directly with bank executives to secure a bank loan 
with fewer collateral requirements. On the other hand, connections with the banks can help 
firms overcome market failure and avoid social and political discrimination, and in turn, 
obtain secured bank loans. This means that creditors are likely to require less collateral on 
their lending to bank-connected firms than non-connected firms. In other words, bank 
connections can alleviate creditors’ concerns over losses on these loans. Therefore, we expect 
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 For example, the governor of Guangxi province encouraged banks’ enthusiasm for disbursing loan funds and 
speeding up bank loan disbursement through every means possible.  
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that collateral requirements are lower for firms with bank connections. Thus, we construct 
our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Collateral requirements are lower for firms with bank connections 
For our next hypothesis, we investigate the mechanism through which bank connection 
works with respect to corruption. In China, a salient feature is the dominant state ownership 
of the banking sector, and the prudential policy that imposes direct control on banks' lending 
decisions. Due to the vulnerabilities presented by an underdeveloped legal system, the vibrant 
non-state sector and its growth depend largely on informal financing based on relationship 
and unconventional governance (Allet et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2009). As China’s banking 
sector is beset by corruption, a recent strand of literature champions the view that corruption 
helps improve credit allocation efficiency and non-state sector growth in the context of 
emerging markets, specifically those in which legal protection is insufficient or unreliable 
(Chen et al., 2013). We argue that through bribery, entrepreneurial firms are able to secure 
bank credit and obtain favourable loan terms in the form of reduced collateral. Here, we 
consider the interacted effect of bank connection and corruption on collateral, and we argue 
that bank connections facilitate corruption, and corruption is exactly the channel through 
which bank connection affects collateral. In other words, bank connection provides a channel 
through which briber gives bribery to the bank officials who control the interest. Empirically, 
we expect that the relationship between bank connection and collateral to become stronger 
with increased corruption. This evidence is consistent with the view of rent seeking, rather 
than expertise provision or monitoring. Thus, we construct our hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Bank connections facilitate corruption, and corruption strengthens the relationship 
between bank connections and collateral requirements. 
2.3.2 Economic stimulus package 
Taking on the new angle of government intervention, we further extend our hypothesis 
relating to the effect of the government's economic stimulus package. Over the whole period 
of the package, China's central and local governments have been trying to achieve social and 
political goals by promoting firm investments and economic growth in business activities 
through their majority ownership in SOEs. In addition, with the enforcement of the stimulus 
package and with the support of both central and local governments, a huge bank credit has 
been increased rapidly as politically driven lending at the firm level for investment. Because 
of government favouritism, SOEs were playing a critical role with a substantial increase in 
investment which is mostly complained as ‘the state owned firms advances and non-state 
retreats’. In other words, since the enforcement of the economic stimulus package, most of 
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the funds have been injected to SOEs for investment, and the private sector has been 
hampered in its development (Wong, 2011). We investigate whether this will worsen the 
private sector financing environment, and bank connection will have more critical effects on 
collateral after the economic stimulus package. Bank connections facilitate rent seeking, 
which can reduce collateral; after the economic stimulus package, this effect in 
entrepreneurial firms became stronger because connected entrepreneurial firms had more 
incentives to seek rents from the banking sector, as they were competing for loan resources 
from state-controlled borrowers. On the other hand, in a bribery scenario, bribers bid for 
more credit allocation and offer the highest bribe in exchange for rent creation (Chen et al., 
2013). In this sense, after the economic stimulus package, when capital allocation becomes 
driven by policy and fewer bank loans are available for entrepreneurial firms, we expect that 
the benefits of reducing collateral through corruption will be eliminated to some extent, as the 
corrupt officials can award limited contracts. Consistent with our discussion above, we 
hypothesise as follows: 
H3a: The negative relation between bank connections and collateral requirements 
becomes stronger for post-economic stimulus package period. 
H3b: The corruption effect on bank connections and collateral association becomes 
weaker for the post-economic stimulus package period.  
 
3. Data and variables 
3.1 The sample selection and classification of bank loans 
We commence our sample with comprehensive data from all the listed entrepreneurial 
firms on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from the Chinese Stock and 
Market Accounting Research database (CSMAR)
6
.  We combine the data from the balance 
sheet, income statement and corporate governance sub-datasets between 2006 and 2009 
because information on a firm’s loan balance is available during this period. The database 
provides detailed information on loan balance with respect to loan type
7
, lender type and 
other contractual terms. Our manual data gathering process begins with a sample of 42,431 
observations for loan balance, from which we identify the credit, guaranteed and 
collateralized loan balance. We then sum each loan balance for each firm for each year to get 
one firm-year observation of total credit, guaranteed and collateralized loan balance. Finally, 
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 This database has also been used by previous studies in China (Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007). 
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we gather 5,263 firm-year observations. From this total population we exclude 106 firm-year 
observations flagged with ST and *ST, because they denote special treatment due to 
irregularity in the financial reporting, and negative profit for two or three consecutive years. 
We also exclude 152 firm-year observations in the financial industry because of their unique 
accounting standards. Finally, we delete 100 firm-year observations with missing 
observations on main variables used in our analysis and 75 firm-year observations with no 
outstanding loans.  Finally, to remain consistent with our previous discussion of sample 
selection, we further exclude every firm with the state listed as the ultimate controlling 
shareholder. Our final sample consists of 640 listed firms and 1,973 firm-year observations.  
Table 1 summarizes the distribution across different types of bank loans identified during 
our sample period. In the full population, we identify the following types of bank loans:  (1) 
credit loans, (2) secured loans (including guaranteed loan, pledged loan and mortgage loan), 
(3) on-balance sheet loans (including project financing and note discounting), (4) off-balance 
sheet loans (including a letter of credit, note acceptance and entrust loan) and (5) other types 
of bank loans. Among these types of loans the database does not specify exactly what is 
secured to obtain the loan, so we manually search for information from the firms’ annual 
reports and quarter reports on whether the loan has been secured by the securities and 
tangible assets of borrowers or third parties. We then classify these loans into guaranteed 
loans, pledged loans and mortgage loans. Among these types of bank loans, we further 
calculate the collateralized loan amount by summing the pledged loans and mortgage loans.     
We further divide all the bank loans into short-term and long-term loans. From Table 1, 
we find that the amount of credit loans awarded to state-controlled firms is 2,542 million 
RMB (the sum of 1,172 and 1,370 million RMB), almost eight times more than the 312.9 
million RMB (189.9 + 123) awarded to entrepreneurial firms (Table 1); this indicates that 
state-controlled firms are more likely to obtain credit loans due to the government’s implicit 
guarantee. We divide secured loans into guaranteed, pledged and mortgage loans. Across the 
firm ownership structure we find that the requirement for collateral is lower for state-
controlled firms and higher for entrepreneurial firms. In particular, the ratios of both short-
term and long-term collateralized loans are 15.99% (5.37% + 10.62%) and 40.1% (13.5% + 
26.6%) respectively for state-owned enterprises, compared with 24.61% (4.76% + 19.85%) 
and 46.7% (19.4% + 27.3%) for entrepreneurial firms. It is interesting to note that collateral 
is even required for short-term loans. One reason could be that long-term loans that mature 
within one year with collateral pledged are classified as short-term loans in our summary. 
The other reason could be that our sample covers the post-crisis period, during which the 
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requirement for collateral was increased by banks in response to higher credit risks. We also 
identify on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet loans. These types of loans make up a 
relatively lower proportion of the total outstanding loans in both state-controlled firms and 
entrepreneurial firms. We further notice that short-term loans account for less than 50% of 
total loan amount, and compared with previous studies, our updated summary confirms that 
state-owned enterprises are more likely to  take out long-term loans (Firth, Lin, Liu and 
Wong, 2009) while pledging lower collateral. In entrepreneurial firms we find that short-term 
loans are the main source of financing, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total amount of 
loans. Moreover, the total amount of loans is lower than that for state-owned enterprises. 
Overall, the figures in Table 1 support the argument that entrepreneurial firms are treated 
unfavourably in state-dominated financial markets (Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008).   
Table 1. Distribution and classification of bank loans for SOEs and entrepreneurial firms
8
 
 Short term Long term  
 Amounts Percentage Amounts Percentage 
Panel A: State-owned enterprises 
Credit loan 1,172 18.18% 1,370 18.1% 
Secured loan     
1. Guaranteed loan 503 7.80% 538 7.1% 
2. Pledged loan 346 5.37% 1,020 13.5% 
3. Mortgage loan 685 10.62% 2,019 26.6% 
On-balance sheet loan     
1. Project financing  874 13.56% 0 0 
2. Note discounting 649 10.07% 18.7 0.2% 
Off-balance sheet loan     
1. Letter of credit 141 2.19% 0 0 
2. Note acceptance 102 1.58% 0 0 
3. Entrust loan 313.7 4.87% 474 6.3% 
Others 1,662 25.78% 2,140 28.2% 
Total 6,447.7 100.00% 7,580 100.0% 
Panel B: Entrepreneurial firms 
Credit loan 189.9 7.85% 123 10.0% 
Secured loan     
1. Guaranteed loan 270.6 11.18% 192 15.6% 
2. Pledged loan 115.2 4.76% 239 19.4% 
3. Mortgage loan 480.2 19.85% 337 27.3% 
On-balance sheet loan     
1. Project financing  448 18.51% 0 0 
2. Note discounting 103 4.26% 0 0 
Off-balance sheet loan     
1. Letter of credit 33.9 1.40% 0 0 
2. Note acceptance 69.1 2.86% 0 0 
3. Entrust loan 216 8.93% 58.5 4.7% 
Others 494 20.41% 283 23.0% 
Total 2,419.8 100.00% 1,232.5 100.0% 
Note: all values in million RMB. 
 
3.2 Collateral 
                                                          
8
 In Table 1, we report the distribution and classification of bank loans for SOEs for a comparison to 




Our main measurement for firm collateral is the ratio of total loans collateralised to total 
loans outstanding at the end of each year. In additional tests we consider alternative measures 
such as:  
Collateral = Collateralized loans / Total loans outstanding 
The literature also uses other proxies for collateral, such as the collateral required on a 
typical loan (Cull and Xu, 2005), asset collateralizability (Binsbergen, Graham and Yang, 
2010) and collateral presence (Jimenez, Salas and Saurina, 2006). In the additional tests we 
consider these alternative measures.   
3.3 Bank connections  
To further examine the mitigating effects of bank connections, we collect data on the 
career paths and former working experience of each firm's top executive
9
 and independent 
director by searching press and online news resources, and combine this information with the 
executive resumes provided by the CSMAR database. Consistent with our discussion above, 
we identify a relationship that is more direct and relevant for influencing bank lending: the 
bank connection. The definition of corporate-bank connection in our study follows the spirit 
of the definition of political connection derived from Faccio (2010). We assert that a 
company is defined as connected to a bank if at least one person in the top management team 
(including the Chairman of the board, CEO, CFO, executive directors or independent 
directors) and the largest shareholders were or are currently the governor or managers of a 
bank. In our definition, we consider all the banks, including the Big Four banks, joint 
commercial banks and foreign banks at different levels, such as headquarters, branches and 
sub-branches. To avoid potential selection bias, we also consider the executive bank 
connection and independent director connection separately in the following empirical 
analysis.  
We summarize and compare these observations in Table 2. Panel A shows the four 
categories of relationship (bank connections, political connections, no connections and both 
bank and political connections) for both top executives and independent directors. We find 
there are 192 observations where executives have bank connections and 149 observations 
where independent directors have bank connections. In addition, there are 70 observations 
where only executives have bank connections and 41 observations where only independent 
directors have bank connections. In Panel B, we further merge the information reported in 
Panel A to directly show the distributions of bank connections and political connections in 
                                                          
9
 The top executive includes the CEO, Chairman, and other executive directors. 
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detail. For example, in row 1, ‘Bank connections’, the figure of 150 indicates there are 150 
observations of firms with bank connections only. There are 915 observations of political 
connection: 330 where both executives and independent board have political connections, 
310 where only independent board members have them and 275 where only executives have 
them.  
Table 2. Distribution of top-executive and independent-director connections 
Panel A: Distribution of connections interactions between top executives and independent directors 












Bank connections 39 70 83 0 192 
No connections 41 720 310 8 1,079 
Political connections 69 275 330 9 683 
Both connections 0 3 16 0 19 
Total 149 1,068 739 17 1,973 
Panel B: Distribution for each category 
 Observations Percentage 
Bank connections 





No connections 720 36.49% 
Political connections  





Both connections 36 1.82% 
Total 1,973 100% 
Note: The values in the above table are the observations in each interaction group. Both connections mean at 
least one of the top executives or independent directors has both bank connection and political connection. Bank 
connections include firm year observations with bank connected executives or independent directors only. 
Broad bank connections include all firm year observations if the firm has bank connections and both 
connections. Political connections include firm year observations with politically connected executives or 
independent directors only. Broad political connections include all firm year observations if the firm has 
political connections and both connections. 
 
3.4 Corruption 
Following Cai et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013), we choose entertainment and travel 
costs (ETCs) as the proxy for corruption. In Chinese firms’ accounting books, ETCs are a 
fudge item used to build relationships (Cai et al., 2011). In practice, ETCs include expenses 
for meals, gifts, touring and transportation and the normal travelling expenses required by 
firms in their normal business operations. Besides legitimate business travel and other 
expenses, ETCs are commonly used as an accounting category to reimburse any expenditures 
used to bribe government officials, clients and suppliers, or simply to account for implicit 
CEO pay and managerial excesses. As our sample only includes listed entrepreneurial firms, 
implicit CEO pay and managerial excesses should be immaterial as a component of ETCs, 
which mainly consists of grease money, protection money and normal business expenditures 
(Chen et al., 2013). Empirically, we scale ETCs by sales in the regression analysis. 
3.5 Control variables 
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To address and isolate the effect of ownership structure on the requirements for collateral, 
we include a set of control variables that have already been shown to exert potential effects 
on collateral. We control for firm characteristics, loan characteristics and corporate 
governance so they are consistent with arguments by Jimenez, Salas and Saurina, (2006) and 
Chen, Lobo, Wang and Yu (2011). All variables are defined in Table 3. 
Table 3. Variable definitions 
Variable name Variable definition 
Panel A: Collateral and ownership structure 
Collateral  Collateralized loans / Total loans 
Bank connections A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has bank connections only 
ETCs Entertainment and travel costs / Sales 
Political connections A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has political connections only 
ESP A dummy variable equal to 1 for post-economic stimulus package 
period and 0 otherwise 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Firm size (Size) Natural log of firm total assets 
Cash-flow volatility The volatility of cash flows for previous three years 
Return on assets (ROA) Net income / Total assets 
Board size (Board) Natural log of total number of directors on the board 
Independent director (Indep) Ratio of independent directors to total directors 
Leverage (Lev) Total debts / Total assets 
Tangibility (Tang) Net property, plant and equipment / Total assets 
Sales growth (Sales) Growth rate of sales for each year 
Prime rate (Prime) Prime lending rate set by the People’s Bank of China 
Debt structure (Structure) Bank loans / Total debts 
Cost of debt financing (Interest expenses + capitalized interest) / Total debts 
Guarantee Guaranteed loans / Total debts 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 4 provides the summary statistics for our sample, including all the variables we 
will use for the univariate and multivariate tests. The results show that the mean (median) of 
the collateral ratio is 35.47% (35.25%), which is higher than 26.2% (13.1%), the mean 
(median) value of collateral reported by Chen, Lobo, Wang and Yu (2011) for the period 
between 2001 and 2006. The average ETCs-to-sales ratio is 1.38%, comparable to the 1.50% 
reported by Cai et al. (2011) and 1.14% by Chen et al. (2013). We also notice that the board 
size in China averages 8.73, of which 3.15 are independent directors. The average proportion 
of independent directors is 36.08%, which is slightly higher than the requirements of the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) that independent directors must account 
for at least one-third of the total numbers on boards for all listed firms. In Panel C, we 
summarise the collateral year by year over the period 2006 to 2009. Obviously, we find that 
the ratio of total loans pledged has been increasing, especially after 2007 when China was hit 
by the global financial crisis, after which banks began to require more collateral.  
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Table 4. Summary statistics  
 Mean Median Observations 
Panel A: Collateral and ownership structure 
Collateral 35.47% 35.25% 1,973 
ETCs / Sales 1.38% 0.67% 1,973 
Bank connections 7.6% 0 1,973 
Political connections 46.38% 0 1,973 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Firm size (Size) in millions 2,360 1,270 1,973 
CF volatility 8.42 9.56 1,973 
Return on assets (ROA) 4.45% 4.52% 1,973 
Board size (Board) 8.73 9 1,973 
Independent director (Indep) 3.15 3 1,973 
Leverage (Lev) 44.73% 45.55% 1,973 
Tangibility (Tang) in millions 1,410 715 1,973 
Sales growth (Sales) 108% 106% 1,973 
Prime rate (Prime) 3.07% 3.25% 1,973 
Debt structure (Structure) 9.97% 2.58% 1,973 
Cost of debt 8.49% 8.49% 1,973 
Guarantee 26.20% 5.12% 1,973 
Panel C: Collateral sorted by year Year Collateral  
 2006 32.00%  
 2007 35.78%  
 2008 36.45%  
 2009 39.85%  
 
4.2 Bank connections and collateral 
In this section we examine the association between corporate bank connection and 
collateral requirement using both univariate and multivariate analyses. In Table 5 Panel A, 
we present the difference tests of collateral requirements and other firm characteristics across 
firms with and without bank connections. This table shows that the collaterals are 
significantly lower in firms with a close connection with the bank, whereas the values of 
other variables are higher in bank-connected firms, except for cash-flow volatility, return on 
assets (ROA) and cost of debt. When we place them together we find that bank connections 
help firms to seek rents from the governments and benefit from favourable loan terms in the 
form of lower collateral requirement (Collateral), as well as higher leverage level (Leverage), 
higher bank loan ratio (Debt structure) and lower interest rate (Cost of debt). We also find 
from the univariate tests that bank connections can also bring firms lower cost of debt and 
higher guaranteed loans. In Panel B, we further split total bank connections into bank 
connection through top executives and shareholders (Exe_bank) and through independent 
directors (Indep_bank), and compare the collateral difference in each of these groups with 
that in the group with no connections. In particular, the average collateral requirements in 
Exe_bank and Indep_bank firms are 32.98% and 35.02%, which are significantly lower than 
38.25% in the no-connection firms (t-test values are -3.38 and -3.23, respectively).  
Table 5. Difference tests between firms with and without bank connections 
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 Bank connection No bank connection Difference tests 
Panel A: Comparison between bank connection and  no bank connection 
Collateral 34.55% 38.25% -3.70%**(-2.74) 
Firm size (million) 2,460 2,330 130(0.62) 
CF volatility 8.23% 8.48% -0.25%(-0.78) 
Return on assets 3.32% 4.82% -1.50%**(-2.48) 
Board size 8.89 8.68 0.21**(2.37) 
Independent director 3.23 3.12 0.11***(3.61) 
Leverage 47.95% 43.67% 4.28%***(4.15) 
Tangibility (million) 1,450 1,400 50(0.35) 
Sales growth 119% 105% 14%(1.36) 
Debt structure 11.42% 9.49% 1.93%**(2.34) 
Cost of debt 8.37% 8.52% -0.15%***(-2.65) 
Guarantee 27.84% 25.66% 2.18%**(2.26) 
Panel B: Difference tests    
 Exe_bank Indep_bank No connection 
 32.98% 35.02% 38.25% 
Exe_bank vs. No connection -5.27%***(-3.38)   
Indep_bank vs. No connection -3.23%**(-2.55)   
** and  *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
To complement our univariate tests, we also conduct a regression analysis by estimating 





















                   
                   
                    
              (1)
 
where Collateral is the fraction of collateralized loans; Bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the firm is connected to banks and 0 otherwise; Size is the log of firm total assets; 
Tangibility is the log of firm’s tangible assets; Sales is the firm’s sales growth rate; Leverage 
is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Structure is the ratio of bank loans to total debt; Cost is 
the interest rate charged on total debt; Guarantee is the fraction of guaranteed loans; 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the cash flow of the previous three years; ROA is the 
return on assets; Board is the log of total number of directors on boards; Indep is the ratio of 
independent directors to total directors; and Prime is the prime lending rate. We also include 
industry and year dummy variables to control for industry and year fixed effects. The results 
of the effect of bank connection on collateral are reported in Table 6.  
Across the three specifications we find that bank connection is negatively related to the 
collateral required, especially the estimates from column 1, which show that the coefficient 
on the bank connection is -0.05 and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.26). 
This result indicates that the average amount of collateral requirement is 5% lower for firms 
with bank connections, while everything else is held constant. Hence, the effect of bank 
20 
 
connection on collateral is economically and statistically significant. In addition, we 
categorise bank connection into executive and independent-director bank connection, and 
input each of them into the regression. In particular, executive bank connection includes 
connection through both the top executive and the largest shareholder. The results are 
reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 6. The estimates from the two specifications in columns 
2 and 3 provide further evidence to support our conjecture, while the estimated coefficient on 
the Exe_bank dummy is -0.07, which is significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.61), and the 
estimated coefficient on the Indep_bank dummy is -0.03, which is significant at the 5% level 
(t-value is -2.06). This result indicates that the average amount of collateral required is 
significantly lower in firms with a close connection with the bank, either through executives 
or independent directors, than in firms with no bank connection. These estimated results are 
consistent with our hypothesis H1 that bank connections facilitate rent seeking from the 
banking sector, resulting in lower collateral requirements.  Another concern of this regression 
analysis is that there are several firm-year observations with both executive and independent-
director bank connections. Repeating our analysis when excluding these groups of firms 
yields similar results to those reported in Table 6. 
Consistent with the extant literature
10
, we also find similar effects for the control 
variables. For example, the assets and tangible assets of larger firms are associated with 
significantly lower collateral, which suggests they are able to access bank loans at a lower 
cost due to a larger supply of securities on their loans. Moreover, the level of leverage and 
fraction of long term loans as part of a firm’s total debt is positively related to collateral in the 
loan, which indicates that the collateral required is higher when creditors realise the firm is 
already levered. Moreover, as Menkhoff, Neuberger and Rungruxsirivorn (2012) discuss with 
regards to emerging markets, third party guarantees and interest rates are substitutes for the 
use of collateral. On this basis we consistently observed negative coefficients for these two 
control variables, which indicate that they are substitutes for collateral. With regards to the 
corporate governance variables, we find that the effects of the number of directors and the 
ratio of independent directors on the board are insignificant, respectively.  
Table 6. The effect of bank connection on collateral 
Dependent variable is the collateral 
Bank -0.05**(-2.26)   
Exe_bank  -0.07***(-2.61)  
Indep_bank   -0.03**(-2.06) 
Firm size -0.07***(-3.38) -0.08***(-3.50) -0.07***(-3.19) 
Tangibility -0.10***(-5.70) -0.10***(-5.19) -0.09***(-4.93) 
                                                          
10
 See Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006), Chen, Li, Su and Sun (2011) and Menkhoff, Neuberger and 
Rungruxsirivorn (2012) for detailed discussions of the effects of control variables on collateral in loans.  
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Sales growth -0.01*(-1.64) -0.01*(-1.69) -0.01*(-1.71) 
Leverage 0.36***(8.67) 0.34***(8.30) 0.34***(8.38) 
Debt structure 0.52***(10.26) 0.52***(10.56) 0.53***(10.84) 
Cost of debt -0.03***(-4.91) -0.03***(-4.79) -0.03***(-4.68) 
Guarantee -0.22***(-10.67) -0.23***(-11.04) -0.23***(-11.03) 
CF volatility 0.65***(3.08) 0.65***(3.48) 0.65***(3.41) 
ROA -0.05(-0.55) -0.05(-0.55) -0.05(-0.51) 
Board size -0.02(-0.45) -0.02(-0.43) -0.02(-0.49) 
Independent director -0.05(-0.31) -0.05(-0.28) -0.02(-0.15) 
Prime rate -0.12***(-7.55) -0.12***(-7.53) -0.12***(-7.61) 
Constant 0.59**(2.30) 0.60**(2.29) 0.63**(2.40) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.33 0.36 0.35 
Observations 1,973 1,973 1,973 
The dependent variable is the fraction of collateralized loans. Bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for bank-
connected firms and 0 for non-bank-connected firms. Exe_bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for bank-
connected firms with an executive bank connection. Indep_bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 for bank-
connected firms with an independent-director bank connection. Definitions of all the other variables are as in 
Table 3.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, 
clustered by the firm.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3 Bank connections, corruption, and collateral 
In this section we consider the mechanism through which the bank connection works to 
attenuate collateral requirement, namely corporate bribery or corruption. The definition of 
corporate corruption in our study follows the spirit of the argument derived from Cai et al. 
(2011) and Chen et al. (2013). In particular, we use the ratio of ETCs to sales as the proxy for 
corruption for the regression estimation.   
We conduct the regression analysis to examine the effect of corruption on the association 
between bank connections and collateral by including a set of control variables which may 
have a potential effect on a firm’s requirement for collateral. To do so, we extend our 
equation (1) by adding an extra variable, corruption, and interact with Bank connection 
dummy variable. Table 7 provides the results of this regression analysis. The coefficients on 
corruption variable are all negative and insignificant (t-values are -0.62, -0.77 and -0.76) 
across three specifications. When we turn to the Bank dummy, Exe_bank dummy, and 
Indep_bank dummy, and the interactive terms between these dummy variables and corruption, 
we find negative coefficients on these terms which are consistent with the univariate tests and 
our main hypotheses. Specifically, from column 1 the estimated coefficient of Bank dummy 
is -0.05 and -3.42 for Bank dummy and corruption interaction term, which is significant at the 
5% and 1% level respectively (t-values are -2.17 and -2.72, respectively), suggesting that the 
average collateral pledged is 5% lower than that in non-bank-connected firms. In addition, 
the coefficient of interaction between Bank dummy and corruption is -3.42 (t-value is -2.72), 
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indicating that an increase of one-standard-deviation in corruption reduces the average 
requirement for collateral by 3.42% for bank-connected firms while the effect is insignificant 
in non-bank-connected firms (insignificant estimated coefficient on Corruption variable). 
This result is consistent with our conjecture that bank connection is effective in reducing 
collateral requirements through corruption, and bank connection is the bridge through which 
corruption works. Our results also support the argument by Chen et al. (2013) that in China 
where the legal and financial systems are underdeveloped, corruption plays a role in 
improving efficiency and aids in entrepreneurial firm growth, through informal external 
finance based on relationship.   
To be consistent with the regression reported in Table 6, we rerun the regression by 
splitting bank connection into executive bank connection and independent director bank 
connection and report the results in column 2 and 3 in Table 7. For example in column 2, we 
find that the estimated coefficients on Exe_bank and Exe_bank*Corruption are both negative 
and significant (t-values are -2.23 and -2.62, respectively). This result is consistent with the 
one when we focus on the bank connection in column 1, suggesting that an increase in one-
standard-deviation in corruption reduces average collateral requirement by 3.80% in 
executive bank-connected firms, and again this effect is insignificant in non-connected firms. 
In column 3 where we turn to focus on independent director bank connection, we find that the 
estimated coefficients on Indep_bank is marginally significant at the 10% level (t-value is -
1.80), and the estimated coefficients on Indep_bank*Corruption is negative while 
insignificant (t-value is -0.95), indicating that the reducing collateral of corruption through 
independent directors bank connection is insignificant.    
To be consistent with the univariate difference tests between sub-samples in Table 5, we 
rerun the regression with three sub-samples, and these results are not reported in this paper. 
The first one includes firms with executive bank connections and independent director bank 
connections only, by excluding the firm-year observations without connections. The second 
one includes firms with bank connections and no connection only, by excluding the firm-year 
observations of independent director bank connections. From these two regressions, we find 
the coefficients for both bank connections and interactive terms between bank connections 
and corruption are negative and statistically significant. The third one includes firms with 
independent director bank connections and no connections only, without including firm-year 
observations of bank connections. The results from this regression suggest that the coefficient 
for Indep_bank is marginally negative, which is complementary to the finding of our results 
in Table 8. However the coefficient of the interactive term between Indep_bank and 
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corruption is negative but not statistically significant. This result indicates that independent 
director bank connection could reduce the requirement for collateral but is not as strong as 
executive bank connections.  
Overall, our results indicate that on average, corporate bank connections through top 
executives and largest shareholders are more effective than that through independent 
directors, and have a direct impact on reducing the collateral, which means that the 
requirement for less collateral is associated with bank connection in emerging markets, at 
least in the context of China. Moreover, our results propose an explanation to the coexisting 
of weak legal system and high private sector growth in China. We offer support to Chen et al. 
(2013) and extend to find that bank connection is the channel through which corruption is 
exercised to improve capital allocation efficiency. We argue that the effect of borrower-
lender relationship differs substantially across countries. In particular, this relationship in 
developed countries, such as U.S., acts to alleviate information asymmetry (facilitate 
information flow) or reduce monitoring costs which benefits firms with favoured loan terms. 
However, in emerging market with underdeveloped financial and legal system, such as China, 
firm’s bank connection acts primarily to facilitate rent seeking from the banking sector by 
obtaining favoured loan terms. Here, though evidence from both developed and emerging 
markets supports the view that close borrower-lender relationship relates to lower collateral 
requirements, our results on corruption effect provide a supporting evidence for the view of 
rent seeking.  We argue that if bank connection works the same way in China as that in 
developed countries to reduce the monitoring costs, corruption’s effect should be either 
significant in reducing collateral in non-bank connection firms or insignificant in all types of 
firms. The result in China shows that corruption works in bank-connected firms, suggesting 
that bank connection is the channel through which corruption is used to seek rents from the 
banking sector, and entrepreneurial firms pay bribes to officials as a means of rent seeking. In 
other words, our results also support Allen et al. (2005) argument that in emerging market, 
entrepreneurial firms’ growth depends on informal external financing based on relationship.  
Table 7. The effect of corruption on bank connection-collateral association 
Dependent variable is the collateral 
Bank -0.05**(-2.17)   
Bank*Corruption -3.42***(-2.72)   
Exe_bank  -0.06**(-2.23)  
Exe_bank*Corruption  -3.80***(-2.62)  
Indep_bank   -0.03*(-1.80) 
Indep_bank*Corruption   -2.59(-0.95) 
Corruption -0.13(-0.62) -0.25(-0.77) -0.24(-0.76) 
Firm size -0.07***(-3.24) -0.07***(-3.47) -0.07***(-3.36) 
Tangibility -0.10***(-5.64) -0.10***(-5.22) -0.09***(-5.12) 
Sales growth -0.01*(-1.79) -0.02(-1.52) -0.01*(-1.74) 
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Leverage 0.37***(8.81) 0.34***(8.43) 0.34***(8.44) 
Debt structure 0.51***(10.20) 0.51***(10.37) 0.51***(10.51) 
Cost of debt -0.03***(-4.84) -0.03***(-4.74) -0.03***(-4.77) 
Guarantee -0.22***(-10.55) -0.23***(-10.95) -0.23***(-11.01) 
CF volatility 0.52***(2.99) 0.65***(3.42) 0.64***(3.45) 
ROA -0.06(-0.62) -0.05(-0.50) -0.06(-0.61) 
Board size -0.02(-0.47) -0.02(-0.46) -0.01(-0.40) 
Independent director -0.03(-0.21) -0.06(-0.43) -0.03(-0.22) 
Prime rate -0.12***(-7.47) -0.12***(-7.55) -0.12***(-7.55) 
Constant 0.64**(2.49) 0.63**(2.40) 0.62**(2.39) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Observations 1,973 1,973 1,973 
Dependent variable is the fraction of collateralized loans. Bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
connected with the banks and 0 otherwise. Exe_bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is connected 
through top executives and largest shareholders. Indep_bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
connected through independent directors. Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 3.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, and 
are clustered by firm.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.4 Economic stimulus package 
In this section we investigate the effect of economic stimulus package (ESP) on the 
association between bank connection and collateral. To conduct a regression analysis, we 
empirically create a new variable ESP, which is equal to 1 for the post-ESP period and 0 for 
the pre-ESP period. We also interact the Pack dummy with the bank connection to examine 
the effect of the ESP on the association between bank connection and collateral. The results 
of this regression are provided in Table 8 column 1. We further examine the effect of 
corruption before and after the economic stimulus package, so we also estimate the regression 
by adding Corruption and interaction terms with Bank and ESP, and report the result in 
column 2 in Table 8.   
The initial results show that the bank connections across both specifications are 
consistently negatively related to collateral. As Table 8 shows, our results also indicate that 
the coefficients of the ESP dummy are negative and statistically significant at the 10% level 
in column 1 (t-value is -1.92). In particular, the estimated coefficient of the ESP dummy 
shown in column 1 is -0.02 which indicates that the average collateral on loans after the 
economic stimulus package is approximately 3.75% lower than that before the ESP. In 
addition, the estimated coefficient of the interactive terms between the bank connection and 
ESP dummy is negative and statistically significant (the coefficient is -0.04, and t-value is -
1.89). These results indicate that after the economic stimulus package, the average collateral 
difference between firms with and without bank connections is dropped by nearly 4%.  These 
results are consistent with our hypothesis H3a in that bank connection matters stronger in 
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reducing the requirements for collateral after the ESP. Then, we turn our concerns to column 
2 where we test that whether the corruption effect differs before and after the economic 
stimulus package. As can be seen from column 2 in Table 8, we find that the estimated 
coefficients on Bank*Corruption and Corruption are both negative and consistent with those 
reported in Table 7, indicating that corruption is effective in reducing collateral and obtaining 
favoured loan terms, but only through bank connections. More important, we find that the 
estimated coefficient on Bank*ESP*Corruption is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level (coefficient is 4.70 and t-value is 2.77). This result suggests that after the 
announcement of the economic stimulus package, the effect of corruption on reducing 
collateral requirements through bank connections has been attenuated, which support our 
hypothesis H3b. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the results by dividing bank 
connection into executive bank connection and independent director bank connection. In 
general, the unreported results suggest that executive bank connection matters more than that 
of independent director bank connection. 
As with the economic stimulus package announced in 2008, bank lending decisions and 
loan capital allocations have been driven by the political and prudential policy imposed, 
which are hugely secured for SOEs. Overall, these estimates indicate that economic stimulus 
package, a form of government intervention, adversely affects the efficiency of banking 
sector which sufficiently eliminates the ameliorating effect of corruption on efficiency. 
Table 8. The effect of bank connection, corruption on collateral during economic stimulus package  
Dependent variable is the collateral 
Bank -0.03***(-2.76) -0.10**(-2.47) 
Bank*ESP -0.04*(-1.89) -0.08***(-2.85) 
ESP -0.02*(-1.92) -0.02*(-1.80) 
Corruption  -0.16(-0.62) 
Bank*Corruption  -6.65***(-4.19) 
Bank*Corruption*ESP  4.70***(2.77) 
Firm size -0.06***(-3.49) -0.07***(-3.25) 
Tangibility -0.09***(-5.09) -0.09***(-4.94) 
Sales growth -0.01**(-2.04) -0.01**(-2.15) 
Leverage 0.32***(7.76) 0.32***(7.99) 
Debt structure 0.53***(10.60) 0.52***(10.58) 
Cost of debt -0.03***(-4.97) -0.03***(-4.93) 
Guarantee -0.23***(-11.28) -0.23***(-11.17) 
CF volatility -0.67***(-3.50) -0.63***(-3.35) 
ROA -0.06(-0.59) -0.08(-0.87) 
Board size -0.02(-0.63) -0.02(-0.50) 
Independent director -0.06(-0.39) -0.02(-0.15) 
Prime rate -0.10***(-7.10) -0.10***(-7.12) 
Constant 0.56**(2.15) 0.58**(2.29) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.34 0.35 
Observations 1,973 1,973 
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Dependent variable is the fraction of collateralized loans. ESP is a dummy variable equal to 1 for post-ESP 
period and 0 for pre-ESP period. Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 3.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, and is 
clustered by firm.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.7 Additional tests 
4.7.1 Bank lending efficiency 
In this section, we conduct additional tests to examine how bank connections and 
corruption affect bank lending efficiency. From the previous analysis, we conclude that bank 
connections and corruption together help firms seek rents from the banking sector in the form 
of lower collateral requirements. However, whether the existence of bank connections and 
corruption can improve bank lending efficiency remains unanswered. Thus, in this section, 
we follow the spirit of Firth et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2013) to examine the effect of bank 
connections and corruption on lending efficiency, where efficient bank lending is reflected by 
a positive relation between bank loan and firm profitability (Firth et al., 2009). Empirically, 











                
   (2) 
where Finance is the proxy for bank financing. We apply Access to bank loan and Bank loan 
size as the measurements in each respective regression. Access to bank loan is a dummy 
variable if the firm has at least one loan from a bank, and Bank loan size is the ratio of 
amount of bank loan to firm total assets. ROS is return on sales, calculated as the ratio of net 
income to total sales; Age is the log of number of years of the firm since it has been 
established; Employee is the log of number of employees; and Duality is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman on the board and 0 otherwise. All the other 
variables are as defined in equation (1). We also include industry and year fixed effect in the 
regression estimation. The results are reported in Table 9 below.  
In Table 9, columns 1 to 3 report the results where we use Access to bank loan as the 
dependent variable, while columns 4 to 6 report the results using Bank loan size as the 
dependent variable. As can be seen from Table 9 across six specifications, the estimated 
coefficients on ROS are all positive and statistically significant, indicating that on average 
firm performance is a main determinant for a firm to get access to bank loans, and for lenders 
being willing to extend credit to financially healthier firms, consistent with Firth et al. (2009). 
The estimated results from using two alternative dependent variables are generally similar, 
and some interesting evidence evolves. In particular, in column 2, we add Bank and 
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Corruption, and interaction terms between them and ROS. The estimated coefficients on 
Bank and Bank*ROS are both positive and significant at the 5% level (t-values are 2.45 and 
2.19, respectively). These results suggest that firms’ bank connections help rent seeking when 
the firms go to access the bank loans, and bank lending is more efficient in bank-connected 
firms. When we turn to Corruption and Corruption*ROS, we also observe positive but 
insignificant coefficients on these variables, indicating that bribery itself is not able to explain 
access to bank loans and lending efficiency. In addition, in column 3, where we add the 
interaction term between Bank, Corruption and ROS, the significant and positive coefficient 
on Bank*Corruption*ROS reveals that bank-connected firms that devote more to bribery are 
more likely to be favoured by lenders and have a higher probability of obtaining bank loans. 
When we use Bank loan size as the dependent variable, the estimated results from columns 4 
to 6 are similar to those in columns 1 to 3. As for the other control variables, we obtain the 
expected coefficients consistent with earlier studies (Chen et al., 2013). Our additional test 
results on bank lending efficiency suggest that capital allocation is efficient to some extent 
for the private sector, while bank connections, and corruption through bank connections, can 
improve lending efficiency, reflected by a stronger relationship between bank loans and firm 
profitability. Overall, our findings corroborate studies by Firth et al. (2009) and Chen et al. 
(2013) and propose an explanation for the coexistence of a vibrant non-state sector and a 
weak legal system. We further argue that in an emerging market where private-sector firms 
experience political and financial discriminations in securing external financing, bank 
connections and corruption facilitate rent seeking and are more likely to improve bank 
lending efficiency and private sector growth.  
Table 9. Regression between bank connection, corruption and bank loan financing 













































Bank*Corruption*ROS   1.97** 
(2.42) 












































































Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.22 0.23 
Observations 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,973 
Access to bank loan is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at least one bank loan. Bank loan size is the 
ratio of amount of bank loans to firm total assets. ROS is return on sales. Age is the log of number of years since 
firm establishment. Employee is the log of number of employees. Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
CEO is also the Chairman on the board. Definitions of all the other variables are as in Table 3.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, and 
are clustered by firm.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.7.1 Endogeneity issue 
One potential concern we have with our previous results on the association between bank 
connection and collateral is the endogeneity of bank connection, which has been noted by 
most previous studies, though our results are not identical (i.e. Chen et al., 2011b). On one 
hand, some bank officials might have resigned their original positions and sought posts in 
better-performing entrepreneurial firms for their monetary and reputational concerns. On the 
other hand, the top executives in firms with better firm performance have a higher probability 
of being nominated as members of government entities. Here, bank connection may be 
endogenously determined by some of the firm-specific characteristics in our regression. We 
attempt to address the endogeneity issue by applying a natural experimental method where 
we use the economic stimulus package as the exogenous policy variable where the bank 
connection is mostly frozen. None of the entrepreneurial firms could forecast the 
announcement of the economic stimulus package, and there was not enough time for non-
bank-connected firms to appoint a bank-connected executive or an independent director to 
seek rents from the government and share the capital allocation from the economic stimulus 
package. In fact, we check the appointment of a new executive or independent director three 
months before the announcement of ESP, and we do not that find any of these cases involves 
the appointment of a bank-connected executive or independent director. In other words, the 
economic stimulus package is an exogenous shock with respect to individual firms. 
Empirically, we again use the ESP dummy variable, which equals 1 for firm-year 
observations falling in the period after the economic stimulus package and 0 otherwise. We 
run the same regression reported in Table 8 but using our new sample by including the firm-
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year observations falling in the year before and the year of the announcement. The sample 
size is now reduced from 1,973 to 909.  
 The results, reported in Table 10, are consistent with our earlier analyses and support the 
view that bank connection is negatively related to collateral, and corruption works in bank-
connected firms. In particular, the estimated coefficients on bank connection, ESP dummy, 
Bank*ESP, and Bank*Corruption are consistently negative, and significantly related to 
collateral. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of Bank*ESP*Corruption is positive, 
indicating that government intervention impedes the efficiency of the banking sector, and the 
corruption effect has been reduced.   
Table 10. The effect of bank connection and corruption on collateral during the economic stimulus 
package: Natural experiment 
The dependent variable is collateral 
Bank -0.06**(-2.26) -0.11**(-2.48) 
Bank*ESP -0.07**(-2.55) -0.10***(-2.85) 
ESP -0.03*(-1.86) -0.02*(-1.86) 
Corruption  -0.03(-0.24) 
Bank*Corruption  -6.09***(-3.48) 
Bank*Corruption*ESP  4.09**(1.98) 
Firm size -0.08***(-3.04) -0.07***(-2.79) 
Tangibility -0.09***(-4.02) -0.09***(-3.87) 
Sales growth 0.01(0.85) 0.00(0.86) 
Leverage 0.32***(5.41) 0.32***(5.42) 
Debt structure 0.51***(7.13) 0.51***(7.12) 
Cost of debt -0.04***(-3.99) -0.04***(-3.90) 
Guarantee -0.25***(-10.05) -0.25***(-9.85) 
CF volatility -0.77***(-3.65) -0.73***(-3.47) 
ROA -0.13(-0.89) -0.17(-1.17) 
Board size -0.02(-0.43) -0.01(-0.28) 
Independent director 0.03(0.13) 0.07(0.37) 
Prime rate -0.07***(-3.48) -0.08***(-3.45) 
Constant -0.07(-0.20) -0.03(-0.10) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.34 0.35 
Observations 909 909 
The dependent variable is the fraction of collateralized loans. Definitions of all the other variables are as in 
Table 8.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, and 
are clustered by firm.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
In addition, we also try to address this endogeneity issue by using the propensity-
matching method. By taking the bank-connected firms as our treatment sample, we construct 
a control sample. A potential match in the control sample is any firm-year observation not 
identified as bank-connected from the same industry as the connected firm. From the set of 
potential matches we select a firm-year observation with the same market capitalization as 
each observation from the treatment sample or, if no such match exists, a firm that is the 
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closest, with no more than a 2% deviation. If still no match exists, the firm is dropped from 
the matching process. This procedure results in a matched sample of 478 firm pairs where the 
treatment and control samples have the same propensity to build bank connections. We then 
run the same regression as in Table 8, using this newly constructed sample. Consistent with 
our regression tests in section 4.3 with different samples, we repeat the propensity-matching 
method to control for the endogeneity issue. The unreported results, broadly similar to those 
using the full sample, are not reported here.   
4.7.2 Other tests 
Our analysis naturally relates to political connection, which has been examined 
extensively (Claessens et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Bliss and Gul, 2012). These 
studies provide evidence for the link between political connection and the terms of loan 
contracts. For example, using a thousand firms in 47 countries, Faccio (2010) points out that 
politically connected firms are more levered and face a lower cost of debt financing than non-
politically connected firms, and Qi et al. (2010) echo that politically connected firms are 
regarded as a lower level of risk, which relates to a higher bond rating and lower cost of 
borrowing. Therefore, we are concerned whether our findings about the bank-connection 
effect will be overridden by the effects of political connection. To address this issue, we 
identify politically connected firms, based on a definition derived from Fan et al. (2007) and 
Faccio (2010). In particular, a firm is defined as politically connected if the Chairman of the 
board, CEO, largest shareholder or other top executives is a member of any of government-
related entities (such as the NPC, CPPCC etc.). Empirically, we create a dummy variable, 
Political, equal to 1 if the firm is politically connected and 0 otherwise. For the regression 
analysis, we add Political and respective interaction terms in each equation. The general 
results show that political connection has a weaker effect in reducing collateral than bank 
connection does. Some of the firm-year observations may have both bank connection and 
political connection, so we repeat our regression analysis by excluding these observations to 
avoid the overlapping effects; this repetition yields results that are relatively consistent with 
those obtained earlier.  
In addition, and consistent with the findings of Claessens et al., (2002) and Lemmon and 
Lins (2003), excess control rights entrench large shareholders, while cash-flow rights give 
them an incentive to exercise effective monitoring. Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et 
al. (2011) provide supporting evidence that divergence between control rights and cash-flow 
rights is positively related to cost of borrowing, while cash-flow rights are negatively related 
to cost of borrowing. To supplement the effect of largest-shareholder ownership, and to check 
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the validity of our results, we repeat our regression analysis by adding a control-ownership 
wedge in each regression and interact with the Bank connection dummy variable. The 
untabulated results show a negative coefficient on the interaction between control-ownership 
wedge and bank connection, and a positive coefficient for control-ownership wedge; both are 
statistically significant. These results suggest that bank connection still matters after 
considering the excess control rights of the largest shareholders. To supplement the incentive 
effect of cash-flow rights, we repeat the above analysis by replacing the control-ownership 
wedge with cash-flow rights; we find that the estimated coefficient on cash-flow rights and 
bank-connection interaction is negative and statistically significant.   
We further check the robustness of our results by applying alternative measures of 
collateral. For example, we follow Cull and Xu (2005), Binsbergen, Graham and Yang (2010) 
and Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006) and use the natural log of collateralized loans and the 
ratio of the sum of plant, property, equipment and inventory to total assets, and use the 
collateral dummy as an alternative proxy for collateral. Overall, our results from the 
multivariate regression using these alternative measures of collateral indicate that bank 
connection is significantly negatively related to the requirement for collateral, which 
facilitates corruption in the context of China.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 The objective of this study is to examine the financial and economic implications of 
bank connections and corruption on collateral requirements. We use data from China’s listed 
firms and bank connections as proxy for the rent seeking by firms, and find that bank 
connection relates to a lower collateral requirement. Our results are a supplement to the fact 
that favoured loan terms can be granted through political connections, which encourages rent 
seeking from banks.   
We also find that collateral is negatively related to corruption, and that this association is 
more pronounced if a firm is connected with the banks through its top executives, large 
shareholders or independent board members. These bank connections have more impact than 
general political connections in terms of reducing collateral and facilitating corruption. In 
particular, we document that executive bank connections matter more than independent-
director bank connections. We further find that the economic stimulus package reduces the 
compensation required by creditors on funds lending in the form of lower pledged collateral, 
and further weakens the negative relation between bank connection and collateral. Moreover, 
we also provide evidence that a negative relationship between corruption and collateral is 
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weakened by the economic stimulus package. Our results in considering the endogeneity 
issue are robust, since we have applied both a natural experimental method and a propensity-
matching method. Various aspects of the test specification have also been changed, and 
alternative measures of connection and collateral have been applied.  
Overall, we argue that in an emerging market, where the financial and legal system is 
underdeveloped, legal protection for creditors and investors is weak and institutionally 
created rent opportunity is prevalent, bank connections can be a substitute for legal protection 
to seek rents from banks, and corruption is effective in improving banking efficiency and 
helping the non-state sector seek rents. Our findings confirm the value of political 







Allen, F., Qian, J., Qian, M., 2005. Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of 
Financial Economics 77, 57-116. 
Attig, N., Fong, W., Gadhoum, Y., Lang, L. H. P., 2006. Effects of large shareholding on 
information asymmetry and stock liquidity. Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2875-2892. 
Bae, K. H., Goyal, V. K., 2009. Creditor rights, enforcement and bank loans. Journal of 
Finance 64(2), 823-860. 
Barth, J. R., Lin, C., Lin, P., Song, F. M., 2009. Corruption in bank lending to firms: Cross-
country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing. Journal 
of Financial Economics 91, 361-388. 
Beck, T., Demriguc-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 2006. Bank supervision and corruption in lending. 
Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2131-2163. 
Beck, T., Levine, R., 2003. Legal institutions and financial development. Handbook of New 
Institutional Economics. The Netherlands: Springer 251-278. 
Berger, A., Udell, G., 2002. Small business credit availability and relationship lending: The 
importance of bank organizational structure 112, 32-53. 
Besanko, D., Thakor, A. V., 1987. Collateral and rationing: sorting equilibria in monopolistic 
and competitive credit markets. International Economic Review 28, 671-689. 
33 
 
Bharath, S.T., Dahiya, S., Saunders, A., Srinivasan, A., 2011. Lending relationships and loan 
contract terms. Review of Financial Studies 24(4), 1141-1203. 
Binsbergen, J. H., Graham, J. R., Yang, J., 2010. The cost of debt. Journal of Finance 65(6), 
2089-2136. 
Bliss, M. A., Gul, F. A., 2012. Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian 
evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 1520-1527.  
Boot, A. W. A., Thakor, A. V., Udell, G. F., 1991. Secured lending and default risk: 
equilibrium analysis, policy implications and empirical results. Economic Journal 101, 458-
472. 
Boot, A.W.A., Thakor, A.V., 2000. Can relationship banking survive competition? Journal of 
Finance 55, 679-713.  
Boubakri, N., Ghouma, H., 2010. Control/ownership structure, creditor rights protection, and 
the cost of debt financing: International evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 2481-
2499. 
Brandt, L. and Li, H. B., 2003. Bank discrimination in transition economies: Ideology, 
information, or incentives? Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, 387-413. 
Brealey, R. A., Myers, S. C., Allen, F., 2011. Principles of corporate finance. 10
th
 edition.  
Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin.  
Cai, H., Fang, H., Xu, L., 2011. Eat, drink, firms, government: an investigation of corruption 
from the entertainment and travel costs of Chinese firms. Journal of Law and Economics 
54(1), 55-78. 
Cao, J., Pan, X., Tian, G., 2011. Disproportional ownership structure and pay-performance 
relationship: Evidence from China’s listed firms. Journal of Corporate Finance 17(3), 541-
554. 
Chang, C., Liao G., Yu, X., and Zheng, N., 2010. Information from relationship lending: 
evidence from loan defaults in China. Working paper. 
Charumilind, C., Kali, R., Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2006. Connected Lending: Thailand before 
the Financial Crisis. Journal of Business 79, 181-217.  
Chava, S., Livdan, D., Purnanandam, A., 2009. Do shareholder rights affect the cost of bank 
loans? Review of Financial Studies 22, 2973-3004. 
Chen, J.P., Li, Z., Su, X., Sun, Z., 2011a. Rent seeking incentives, corporate political 
connections and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 17(2), 229-243.  
34 
 
Chen, S., Sun, Z., Tang, S., Wu, D., 2011b. Government intervention and investment 
efficiency: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance 17, 259-271. 
Chen, Y., Liu, M., Su, L., 2013. Greasing the wheels of bank lending: Evidence from private 
firms in China. Forthcoming. 
Chen, Z., Lobo, G. J., Wang, Y., Yu, L., 2011c. Loan collateral and accounting conservatism. 
Working paper. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H.P., 2000. The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81-112.  
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., Lang, L.H.P., 2002. Disentangling the incentive and 
entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57, 2741-2771. 
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., Laeven, L., 2008. Political connections and preferential access to 
finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 554-580. 
Cull, R., Xu, L., 2003. Who gets credit? The behaviour of bureaucrats and state banks in 
allocating credit to Chinese state-owned enterprises. Journal of Development Economics 71, 
533-559.  
Cull, R., Xu, L., 2005. Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit 
reinvestment among Chinese firms. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 117-146. 
Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal 
of Corporate Finance 7(3), 209-233. 
Engelberg, J., Gao, P., Parsons, C. A., 2013. Friends with money. Journal of Financial 
Economics 103, 169-188. 
Faccio, M., Lang, L.H.P., 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. 
Journal of Financial Economics 65, 365-395. 
Faccio, M., 2006. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review 96(1), 369-386. 
Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., McConnell, J. J., 2006. Political connections and corporate 
bailouts. Journal of Finance 61(6), 2597-2635.  
Faccio, M., 2010. Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A 
cross-country analysis. Financial Management 39(3), 905-928. 
Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J., Zhang, T., 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate 
governance and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of 
Financial Economics 84, 330-357. 
Fan, C. S., Lin, C., Treisman, D., 2009. Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence 
from around the world. Journal of Public Economics 93, 14-34. 
35 
 
Fan, G., Wang, X., Zhu, H., 2011. The marketization index of China: The process of regional 
marketization report 2011. Beijing: Economic Science Press. 
Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J., Zhang, T., 2012. Institutions and organizational structure: The case 
of state-owned corporate pyramids. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 28(5), 1-61. 
Firth, M., Lin, C., Liu, P., Wong, S. M. L., 2009. Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation 
in China’s private sector. Journal of Banking and Finance 33, 1144-1155. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A., 2010. Extreme governance: an analysis of dual-class firms 
in the United States. Review of Financial Studies 23, 1051-1088.  
Hainz, C., 2003. Bank competition and credit markets in transition economies. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 31, 223-245. 
Hainz, C., Weill, L., Godlewski, C.J., 2012. Bank competition and collateral: Theory and 
evidence. Journal of Financial Services Research. Forthcoming.  
Harrington, S. E., 2009. The financial crisis, systemic risk and the future of insurance 
regulation. Journal of Risk and Insurance 76(4), 785-819. 
Houston, J. F., Lin, C., Ma, Y., 2011. Media ownership, concentration and corruption in bank 
lending. Journal of Financial Economics 100, 326-350. 
Jian, M., Xu, M., 2012. Determinants of the guarantee circles: The case of Chinese listed 
firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 20, 78-100. 
Jimenez, G., Saurina, J., 2004. Collateral, type of lender and relationship banking as 
determinants of credit risk. Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 2191-2212. 
Jimenez, G., Salas, V., Saurina, J., 2006. Determinants of collateral. Journal of Financial 
Economics 81, 255-281. 
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2000. Tunneling. Am. Econ. 
Rev. 90 (2), 22-27.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law and finance. Journal 
of Political Economy 106(6), 1113-1155. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. 
Journal of Finance 2, 471-517. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Investor protection and 
corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-27. 
Lemmon, M., Lins, K. V., 2003. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: 
Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis 4, 1445-1468. 
Lerner, J., Schoar, A., 2005. Does legal enforcement affect financial transactions? The 
contractual channel in private equity. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(1), 223-246. 
36 
 
Li, H. B., Meng, L. S., Zhang, J. S., 2006. Why do entrepreneurs enter politics? Evidence 
from China. Economic Inquiry 44(3): 559-578. 
Li, H. B., Meng, L., Wang, Q., Zhou, L., 2008. Political connections, financing and firm 
performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of Development Economics 87, 
283-299. 
Li, K., Wang, T., Cheung, Y.L., Jiang, P., 2011. Privatization and risk sharing: evidence from 
the split share structure reform in China. Review of Financial Studies 24, 2499-2525.  
Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., Xuan, Y., 2011. Ownership structure and the cost of corporate 
borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 100, 1-23.  
Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., Xuan, Y., 2012. Corporate ownership structure and bank loan 
syndicate structure. Journal of Financial Economics 104, 1-22.  
Lin, K., Piotroski, J.D., Tan, J., and Yang, Y.G., 2012. Exit as Voice: The intended 
consequence of independent director resignations in an emerging economy. SSRN working 
paper.  
Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., Pagano, M., 2001. Collateral versus project screening: A model of 
lazy banks. Rand Journal of Economics, 32, 726-744. 
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., Xie, F., 2009. Agency problems at dual-class companies. Journal 
of Finance 64(4), 1697-1727. 
Maury, B., Pajuste, A., 2004. Multiple controlling shareholders and firm value. Journal of 
Banking and Finance 29, 1813-1834.  
Menkhoff, L., Neuberger, D., Suwanaporn, C., 2006. Collateral-based lending in emerging 
markets: Evidence from Thailand. Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 1-21. 
Menkhoff, L., Neuberger, D., Rungruxsirivorn, O., 2012. Collateral and its substitutes in 
emerging markets’ lending. Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 817-834. 
Miller, D.P., Puthenpurackal, J.J., 2002. The costs, wealth effects and determinants of public 
yankee bond offerings. Journal of Financial Intermediation 11, 455-485.  
Nguyen, H., Qian, R., 2012. The cross-country magnitude and determinants of collateral 
borrowing. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. 
Parlour, C., Plantin, G., 2008. Loan sales and relationship banking. Journal of Finance 63(3), 
1291-1314. 
Qi, Y., Roth, L., Wald, J. K., 2010. Political rights and the cost of debt. Journal of Financial 
Economics 95, 202-226. 
Qian, J., Strahan, P., 2007. How laws and institutions shape financial contracts: the case of 
bank loans. Journal of Finance 62, 2803-2834. 
37 
 
Rajan, R., Zingales, L., 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic Review 
88, 559-596. 
Sapienza, P., 2004. The effects of government ownership on bank lending. Journal of 
Financial Economics 72(2), 357-384. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 1993. Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3), 
599-617. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 
52(2), 737-783. 
Wei, K.C.J., Zhang, Y., 2008. Ownership structure, cash flow, and corporate investment: 
evidence from East Asian economies before the financial crisis. Journal of Corporate Finance 
14, 118-132.  
Wei, S. J., Wang, T., 1997. The Siamese twins: Do state owned banks favour state owned 
enterprises in China. China Economic Review 8(1), 19-29. 
White, H., 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48 (4), 817-838.  
Wong, Y. C., Wong, M. L., 2001. Competition in China’s domestic banking industry. Cato 
Journal 21(1), 19-41. 
Yang, J. Y., and Qian, H., 2008. Survey evidence on commercial bank mortgage loans. 
Journal of Financial Research 333, 79-87 (in Chinese). 
Yeung, G. 2009. How banks in China make lending decisions, Journal of Contemporary 
China, 18(59), 285-302. 
 
